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Can the ICC Consider Questions 
on Jus Ad Bellum in a War 
Crimes Trial? 
Thomas S. Harris* 
War has forever been considered the utmost necessary evil. 
Nevertheless, international law has for some time sought to limit 
the right to wage war (jus ad bellum), as well as the means and 
methods employed amid war (jus in bello). Although these two 
branches of law now share humanitarian purposes – the 
prevention of war and its effects – they have generally been kept 
separate throughout history. However, confronted with 
widespread violations of jus in bello, resulting in appalling 
humanitarian disasters, some have suggested amending their 
relationship. This was notably sought at the Nuremberg Trials, 
where prosecutors failed to contend that jus in bello was 
inapplicable due to the illegal use of force by Germany. More 
recently, calls are being made to grant the “legitimate” 
belligerent more leeway in their application of jus in bello when 
responding to terrorism and the increasing use of lawfare (abuse 
of jus in bello to achieve strategic military or political ends). 
The ICC, as the only permanent criminal court with potentially 
worldwide jurisdiction, would be best suited to reconsider the 
relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, potentially 
discriminating against the illegal belligerent in its assessment of 
proportionality in attack. In response to these calls for 
“aggressor discrimination,” this article will demonstrate that the 
ICC is prohibited from considering jus ad bellum in a war 
crimes trial, therefore precluding such discrimination. 
Suggestions of “fighting fire with fire” ignore the very principles 
and rationale of the two branches of law and put innocent 
civilians at risk. Lowering the humanitarian bar can surely not 
be the answer to ultimate humanitarian concerns.     
 
 
 
 
* LL.B. Law with French from the University of Sussex, LL.M. 
Globalisation and Law (human rights track) from Maastricht 
University. The author is currently interning at Geneva for Human 
Rights, an NGO providing training to those who work in the field on 
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I. Introduction 
Jus ad bellum (right to war) and jus in bello (law in warfare) are 
two distinct branches of international law that govern two distinct 
situations: the initial use of armed force and individual military 
operations within an armed conflict, respectively. Although they are 
both motivated by humanity, they do have different aims and have 
been largely kept separate throughout the history of the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC).1 While jus ad bellum tries to abolish war altogether, 
jus in bello tries to minimise suffering and destruction, recognizing 
that war remains an unfortunate reality.     
Recently, however, there are increasing calls from certain jurists 
to allow jus ad bellum to influence jus in bello.2 They contend that, in 
 
1. R. KOLB & R. HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS 21-23 (2008). 
2. See generally Alexander Orakhelashvili, Overlap and Convergence: The 
Interaction Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 12 J. Conflict & 
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the face of the increasing practice of ‘lawfare’ (abuse of jus in bello to 
achieve strategic military or political ends)3 and intensifying disregard 
of LOAC, the legality of the use of force should determine the margin 
of discretion granted to a belligerent in relation to proportionality in 
attack. The result grants the legal belligerent a wider margin of 
discretion or the illegal belligerent a more limited margin of 
discretion. This concept shall be referred to as “aggressor 
discrimination.” 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the only permanent 
international criminal court with potentially universal jurisdiction 
that has jurisdiction over war crimes.4 The ICC is, therefore, at the 
very heart of the debate around the relationship between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. Starting with the belief that the two concepts 
should be kept separate, I set out to answer the question: Can the 
ICC consider questions on jus ad bellum in a war crimes trial? 
Before answering this question, I will first consider the definition 
and historical development of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
separately, as well as their historical relationship, as this will reveal 
the rationale behind the two branches of law (Section II). We will 
then analyse proportionality at the ICC (Section III.B), the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over aggression (Section III.C), principles of individual 
criminal responsibility (Section III.D), principles of LOAC (Section 
III.E), and case law (Section III.F), to determine the answer in 
conclusion (Section IV).    
II. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello: Two distinct 
concepts 
A. Jus ad bellum (right to war) 
1. History 
Just war (500 BC – 1300) 
 
The first recorded allusions to a right to wage war date back to 
classical times. Remarks by theorists including Thucydides, Aristotle, 
 
Security L. 157 (2007) (explaining the differences between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello). 
3. See infra Part III.F.  
4. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE 146 (3rd ed. 2010); see Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court arts. 1, 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/3 
(1998) (establishing the court’s personal jurisdiction over any state that 
enters into the agreement, and its subject matter jurisdiction over war 
crimes). 
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and Plato did place war within the broader concept of natural law but 
did not go beyond the occasional observation.5 
The Romans would go on to establish a formal link between law 
and war, requiring approval from their fetials (priests) before going to 
war. This developed into the formal concept of jus bellum – just war – 
which would be formalized following the expansion of Christianity 
within the Roman Empire. It was then significantly developed during 
the Middle Ages.6 Notwithstanding the many interpretations and 
evolutions it underwent over this time, the overarching theory was 
that war was a punishment sanctioned and determined by God in 
response to wrongdoing. Little was said of the means of waging war 
and they were generally assumed to be unlimited so far as the war 
was just.7  
Grotius (1300 – 1900) 
 
During the Middle Ages, it became apparent that the 
establishment of a unified Christian republic was unlikely, as the 
former Roman Empire split into independent political states. This 
raised the issue of determining the just cause of a war when two or 
more of these unfamiliar entities fought one another; no longer were 
they fighting on behalf of the Emperor and axiomatically on behalf of 
God. 8 The vacuum left by the fall of the Empire was to be filled by 
positive law which rendered the concept of just war obscure. At this 
time of great political and religious turmoil, many suggested 
competing theories of just war; the main point of contention being 
who would be the authority. It became somewhat tacitly agreed that, 
lacking a superior authority, any ruler had the right to wage war, as 
long as he perceived his cause to be just.9  
The apparent shift towards war as a transnational rather than 
theocratic issue was stymied by Grotius, considered by some as the 
“father of international law,”10 who suggested transposing the 
fundamental principles of just war theory into international law. The 
problem for Grotius was the lack of an arbiter; his solution would go 
no further than to suggest a list of just causes and urge  going to war 
 
5. Joachim Von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in 
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 665, 665-66 (1939). 
6. Id. at 666-67. 
7. Jasmine Moussa, Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming 
the separation of the two bodies of law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963, 
966 (2008).  
8. Von Elbe, supra note 5, at 669-70. 
9. Id. at 670-75. 
10. See HAMILTON VREELAND, JR., HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE 
MODERN SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press 
1917). 
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only when ultimately necessary.11 Despite its glaring flaws, this did 
represent the first major step towards international codification of  jus 
ad bellum.  
Grotius’ theories were evidently inspired by his experience of the 
Eighty Years’ War (Dutch Revolt) followed by the Thirty Years’ 
War. Although he would not see the end of the latter, his writings 
would be hugely influential in the formulation of the treaties which 
constituted the Peace of Westphalia.12 Accordingly, Grotius’ 
suggestions would determine several aspects of the new-fangled 
principle of Westphalian sovereignty which dominated international 
politics and law until the twentieth century. States had complete 
freedom to go to war with one another if they so chose and Grotius’ 
principles found expression in the treaties concluded between states. 
These treaties came to be considered the Law of Nations.13 
 
Covenant of the League of Nations (1900-1945) 
 
As Westphalian sovereignty developed, it became rather normal 
to go to war for the slightest of injuries. It would only be towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, with advances in technology allowing 
for immense destruction and suffering coupled with a rise in radical 
nationalism, that the idea of limiting jus ad bellum would return to 
the fore.14 Following the “Great War,” the League of Nations was 
established to avoid repetition of such an event and its Covenant 
contained provisions either limiting or at times outright prohibiting 
war.15 With much discord and little support from major powers, the 
League failed and Europe prepared itself to host the most widespread 
and deadliest war in history.16 Amidst the barbaric horrors of World 
War Two, there was little point in considering principles of jus ad 
bellum.    
 
 
 
11. Von Elbe, supra note 5, at 676-80. “Just causes are primarily defence, 
recovery of property, and punishment; unjust causes, among others, are 
the desire for richer land, the desire for freedom on the part of a state in 
political subjection, or the wish to rule others against their will on the 
pretext that it is for their good. Generally speaking, war is a procedure 
for the assertion of rights.” Von Elbe, supra note 5, at 678-79.  
12. Ove Bring, The Westphalian Peace Tradition in International Law: 
From Jus ad Bellum to Jus contra Bellum, 75 INT’L L. STUD. 58, 58-59 
(2000). 
13. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
14. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
15. See League of Nations arts. 10 -16. 
16. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 10. 
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UN Charter framework (1945-Present) 
 
As the dust settled around the globe and the true extent of 
annihilation became clear, the squabbles surrounding the Covenant of 
the League of Nations were soon forgotten and fifty-one nations came 
together to agree on the prohibition of the unilateral use of force. 17 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations can be considered as 
the best definition of jus ad bellum even today and provides that, 
“[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”18 
This must be read in conjunction with Article 51 and the powers 
provided for by Articles 39-50 of the Charter, which allow for the use 
of force in self-defence or following a Chapter VII resolution to that 
effect, respectively.  
2. Proportionality and necessity under jus ad bellum 
Although the Charter does not define the standards of 
proportionality or necessity in the exercise of jus ad bellum, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has confirmed that any measures 
taken in self-defence must be proportionate and necessary to respond 
to the attack in question. The standard set by the Nicaragua case is 
that “states can unilaterally resort to force only defensively, in the 
presence of an armed attack and to the extent necessary to repel it.”19     
3. Violation: aggression 
Manifest violation of jus ad bellum (or rather, violations of the 
prohibition of the use of force) entails the crime of aggression20.  
 
17. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 11-12 (discussing how the Charter of 
the United Nations “prohibit[s] unilateral uses of force” by states that 
are party to it). 
18. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
19. Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUROPEAN 
J. INT’L L. 359, 370 (2009). “[The Charter] does not contain any specific 
rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule 
well established in customary international law.” Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176 (June 27). 
20. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 8bis:  
 Crime of aggression 
 1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
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At the inter-state level, this represents a violation of the UN 
Charter and the potential triggering of Chapter VII powers against 
the aggressor (as well as the justified use of self-defence by the victim-
state). In 1974, the UN General Assembly defined aggression in 
Resolution 3314, although this has been of very little use.21 At an 
individual level, aggression was made a crime under the jurisdictions 
of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) and Tokyo 
IMT but has since not been justiciable.22 Despite being a crime listed 
 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the 
following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance 
with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
 (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by 
the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
 (b) (Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory 
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the 
territory of another State; 
 (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
 (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
 (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in 
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any 
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of 
the agreement; 
 (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the 
 disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
 (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or 
its substantial involvement therein. 
21. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Definition of Aggression, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL 
LIBR. INT’L L. (2008). available at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/da/da_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/28LZ-
S36X]. 
22. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 309-07 (describing the development 
of international trials for aggression).  
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in Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, aggression was excluded 
from the jurisdiction of the court until agreement would be reached 
on its definition. In 2010, agreement was reached and we now have a 
definition. Activating jurisdiction now depends on a decision taken to 
that effect, by a two-thirds majority of States Parties after January 
2017.23   
B. Jus in bello (law in waging war) 
1. History  
The law of armed conflict 
 
Although rules and laws regulating war have been recorded since 
ancient times,24 the formal law of armed conflict (aka jus in bello, aka 
international humanitarian law) has a much shorter history than that 
of jus ad bellum. LOAC materialised rather progressively, responding 
largely to the shift from limited to total war which occurred between 
the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.25  
 
From limited to total war (1600-1860) 
 
With the emergence of the nation-state and rulers left more or 
less to their own devices, war became a general-use political device. A 
king who felt the need for change (whether it be political, territorial, 
sectarian etc.) would set his army against the army of his opponent. 
Civilians were largely left out of war and primitive weaponry limited 
devastation.26 Although several notable jurists, including Grotius, had 
made allusion to a jus in bello,27 limited war remained common 
practice for several centuries without the perceived need for LOAC.    
The industrial revolution brought with it more destructive and 
deadlier weapons. This development, coupled with the rise in radical 
nationalism, gradually led to the practice of total war: widespread 
 
23. CRYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 322. 
24. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 264.  
25. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 29-30 (explaining how LOAC can 
create problems in modern applications and describing issues arising 
from the necessity to protect civilians during armed conflict). 
26. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 29-30 (explaining, “[t]hus, it can be 
seen that the wars of the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries were 
‘limited wars.’ Direct participation was limited to professional armies of 
relatively small numbers; they did not drag the whole of the belligerent 
nation into the war; and they were fought with arms of limited range 
and destructiveness.”). 
27. Moussa, supra note 7. 
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suffering, death, and destruction to the military and civilians alike.28 
One man particularly troubled by this clear progression was Henri 
Dunant, who, having witnessed the battlefield at Solferino in 1859, 
published an article detailing the horrors he had witnessed. This 
article would provide the impetus to begin codifying LOAC as we 
know it today.29   
 
Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, treaties regulating 
specific areas and customary law (1860-present) 
 
Inspired by Dunant’s account, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) was established in 1863, and drafted the first 
Geneva Convention (GC) a year later, which was later adopted by 
twelve major European powers. This first treaty protects sick and 
wounded members of the armed forces in the battlefield and was 
followed by the 1907 Hague Regulations (HC), regulating the means 
and methods of warfare.30 The horrors of two world wars would then 
prompt revision and adaptation of the first GC (already revised in 
1906 and 1929)31 into four separate treaties in 1949. GCI still protects 
the sick and wounded in the field, while GCII protects the wounded, 
sick, and shipwrecked at sea, GCIII protects prisoners-of-war, and 
GCIV protects civilians. On top of these, since 1977, states may sign 
and ratify two Additional Protocols (AP). API adds a whole range of 
regulations in relation to international armed conflicts, whereas APII 
adapts many of the rules and protections offered in the GCs to non-
international conflicts.  
This core LOAC is supplemented by numerous treaties dealing 
with specific matters, whether it be a particular mean or method of 
warfare, a certain class of person or object, a certain crime, etc.32 
Treaties regulating LOAC conflict are amongst the most widely 
 
28. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 30 (describing how nationalism 
increased the difficulty of protecting civilians, given their participation 
in hostilities, and how industrialism led to the “deliberat[e] target[ing]” 
of civilians). 
29. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 264-65 (explaining the “codification 
and progressive development” of international humanitarian law from 
1859-1977). 
30. CRYER ET AL., supra note 4, at 265. 
31. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in 
Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, ICRC, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/120?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/6USE-KJYP].  
32. See generally Treaties and States Parties to such Treaties, ICRC, 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl [perma.cc/26QT-NU77] (containing a 
comprehensive list of LOAC treaties). 
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signed and ratified;33 so much so that much of the HCs and GCs are 
now considered customary.34  
2. Principles of LOAC  
There are several principles which apply throughout LOAC and 
give it its distinctively humanitarian character:35    
 
Proportionality and necessity in attack can be considered as the 
founding principles which underlie the subsequent more specific 
principles, and shall be independently considered in the next 
subsection.  
The principle of distinction requires that “parties to the conflict 
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. 
Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not 
be directed against civilians.”36    
As the first class of persons protected by formal LOAC, the 
protection of sick and wounded combatants remains fundamental.  
The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited 
outright.  
The principle of the equality of belligerents (that LOAC applies 
equally to all warring parties) is not as certain as those others 
mentioned here; in fact, it is the fundamental issue underlying this 
article.37 
3. Proportionality and necessity under jus in bello 
The test of proportionality under jus in bello is determined by 
each individual military action.38 Article 51(5)(b) of API prohibits 
 
33. See generally id. (the list of treaties and parties also identifies parties 
who have ratified the treaties). 
34. See generally JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME I: RULES 
(2005), available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1 
[perma.cc/DDZ2-E9BY] (providing a study on customary international 
humanitarian law). 
35. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 15-19 (for a detailed account of the 
principles of LOAC). 
36. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at 3. 
37. See Adam Roberts, The equal application of the laws of war: a principle 
under pressure, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 932-33 (2008) (explaining 
the “equal application principle”). 
38. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 42 (July 8), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZWL7-DHTC] 
(explaining that the lawful use of proportionate force also incorporates 
the principles of LOAC).  
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attacks which “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.”39 
Necessity, on the other hand, is not explicitly codified but very 
evidently implied in many LOAC rules. It is best described as 
permitting “measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a 
legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by 
international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict the 
only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of 
the other parties to the conflict.”40 
4. Violation: War Crimes 
Grave breaches of LOAC constitute war crimes.41 At the state 
level, this triggers the usual international dispute settlement 
procedures and possibly, although unlikely, and only ever in response 
to the most serious war crimes, Security Council intervention.42 Some 
also contend that Common Article 1 to the GCs imposes a duty on 
states to react to breaches of LOAC as an erga omnes obligation.43 
There are a few dedicated mechanisms created by LOAC, although 
these are merely investigatory.44 Alternatively, there are indirect 
 
39. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) art. 51 ¶5(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol 1]. 
40. Military Necessity, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? (May 6, 2012), 
https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/glossary/military-necessity-
glossary.htm [https://perma.cc/CK27-HWAV].   
41. See generally Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 
49-50, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First GC]; Geneva 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 50-51, Oct. 21, 
1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second GC]; Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 129-30, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third GC]; Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 146-
47, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth GC]; Protocol I, 
supra note 39, at arts. 11, 85 (the GCs require only grave breaches of 
their provisions to be prosecuted). 
42. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 284-85. 
43. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 287-88. 
44. See generally  KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 284-92 (examples include 
employing a “protecting power” under Common Articles 8/8/8/9 GCs; 
using the International Fact Finding Commission provided for by 
Article 90 API; referring to National Red Cross or Red Crescent 
Societies. For a detailed account of LOAC enforcement mechanisms). 
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routes to prosecuting war crimes; for example, by prosecuting war 
crimes as breaches of human rights obligations or by reporting war 
crimes as breaches of a state’s human rights obligations.  
Nevertheless, these mechanisms are sorely underused and the 
most adequate response to war crimes remains criminal prosecution.45 
The first and foremost role of states is to incorporate LOAC into their 
domestic systems and prosecute those within their jurisdiction for war 
crimes.46 Should this be impracticable for whatever reason, there are 
alternatives, including establishing a hybrid court (e.g. Special Court 
for Sierra Leonne), establishing an international criminal tribunal (e.g. 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), or 
referring the situation to the ICC.  
C. Distinguishing jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
1. Historical distinction 
As soon as the formal jus in bello began to emerge, with the 
demise of just war theory and the rise of the nation-state, jurists 
implored its separation from jus ad bellum. Grotius would be one of 
the first to write of these two separate principles, stipulating the need 
for equality between belligerents in the absence of an arbiter to 
determine the justness of a war.47 It is Kant, however, who is credited 
with explicitly distinguishing between them in his 1887 work The 
Philosophy of Law: An Exposition on the Fundamental Principles of 
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right.48 As can be readily deduced, 
calls to distinguish between jus ad bellum and jus in bello were heard 
long before the adoption of any of the GCs or HCs. Such was the 
academic resolve at the time, coupled with the rise in increasingly 
destructive means and methods of warfare, that the detached 
approach was adopted (or perhaps never even questioned) when 
drafting the GCs, HCs, and subsequent LOAC treaties.  
The question of whether or not to distinguish between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello was not significantly raised until the use of 
force was made illegal following WWI.49 Following WWII, and with 
 
45. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 284-92.  
46. See First GC, supra note 41, at art. 49; Second GC, supra note 41, at 
art. 50; Third GC, supra note 41, at art. 129; Fourth GC, supra note 41, 
at art. 146; Protocol I, supra note 39, at art. 80; HENCKAERTS & 
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 34, at 558.  
47. Moussa, supra note 7. 
48. Moussa, supra note 7, at 966 n.18. 
49. See What are jus ad bellum and jus in bello?, ICRC RESOURCE CTR. 
(Jan. 1, 2004), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5kzjjd.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JRQ3-VAQ2] (discussing how the Covenant of the 
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the commencement of the many war crimes trials, the issue reached 
its peak. Time after time tribunals rejected arguments from the 
prosecutor claiming that Germany could not benefit from LOAC due 
to its illegal use of force.50 In one such confirmation of the distinction 
between the two principles, the Tribunal stated: “Whatever may be 
the cause of a war that has broken out, and whether or no[t] the 
cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules of international law are 
valid as to what must not be done, may be done, and must be done 
by the belligerents themselves in making war against each other.”51  
2. Distinction under LOAC 
LOAC is drafted in neutral terms, without any reference to 
aggressor discrimination, already suggesting equal application between 
belligerents. Furthermore, there are a number of provisions and 
principles which emphasise equality in various LOAC instruments. It 
is useful to note that domestic military manuals usually adopt the 
same disinterested definition of proportionality as provided by Article 
51(5)(b) API.52 
International Armed Conflicts (IAC) 
 
Article 1 of the GCs and APs require the same undertaking “to 
respect and to ensure respect for this [Convention/Protocol] in all 
circumstances.”53 “In all circumstances” strongly suggests the respect 
does not vary depending on the legality of the use of force. However, 
API provides the most explicit reiteration of the equality of 
belligerents. API’s preamble states that it and the GCs “must be fully 
applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those 
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or 
 
League of Nations (1919) and subsequently the Paris Treaty (1928) 
made the unilateral use of force illegal). 
50. Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story: Lawfare and the Mixing 
of Proportionalities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 707, 720 (2011). 
51. U.S. v. List et al., Case No. 7, Trial Judgment, ¶ 3(v) (Nuremberg Mil. 
Trib. Feb. 19, 1948); U.S. v Altstötter  et al., Case No. 35, Trial 
Judgment, ¶ 5(x) (Nuremberg Mil. Trib. Dec. 4, 1947) (“If we should 
adopt the view that by reason of the fact that the war was a criminal 
war of aggression every act which would have been legal in a defensive 
war was illegal in this one, we would be forced to the conclusion that 
every soldier who marched under orders into occupied territory or who 
fought in the homeland was a criminal and a murderer.”). 
52. Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS [hereinafter 
Rule 14], available at https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 [https://perma.cc/W6H2-
YQ6W]. 
53. See sources cited supra note 41, at arts. 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.1 (respectively). 
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origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed 
to the Parties to the conflict.”54    
 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) 
 
NIAC law is much less developed than the law for International 
Armed Conflicts (IAC), and there are no explicit references to the 
principle of proportionality, much less to the equality of belligerents. 
However, it has been argued that the principle of proportionality is 
inextricably linked to the principle of humanity, which is enshrined in 
the Preamble to APII.55 
To conclude this section, the absence of aggressor discrimination 
in LOAC, along with the accordingly neutral approach of Rule 14 of 
the ICRC Customary Study (proportionality in attack),56 demonstrate 
that, not only is equality of belligerents customary, the possibility of 
aggressor discrimination had simply not been considered when 
drafting LOAC (reference to equality of belligerents occurring as late 
as 1979).    
III. Can the ICC consider questions on jus ad bellum in 
a war crimes trial?  
A. Introduction  
Under Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction 
over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and (pending 
approval by two- thirds of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP)) 
aggression.  Article 8 provides a definition of war crimes. 
Furthermore, Article 21 lays out the applicable law as follows: 
1.The Court shall apply: 
a. In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
b. In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties 
and the principles and rules of international law, including the 
established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
c. Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court 
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as 
 
54. Protocol I, supra note 39, at pmbl. 
55. Rule 14, supra note 52. 
56. Rule 14, supra note 52 (“Launching an attack which may be expected to 
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is 
prohibited.”). 
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appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with 
international law and internationally recognised norms and 
standards.   
2.The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted 
in its previous decisions.57 
The Rome Statute does not explicitly prohibit, nor permit, the 
ICC to consider questions of jus ad bellum in a war crimes trial. 
However, we will now see how such considerations are prohibited 
elsewhere or implicitly by the Rome Statute, as well as considering 
general legal principles with the same effect.  
B. Proportionality at the ICC 
Article 8(2)(b)(vi) of the Rome Statute sets out the standard of 
proportionality in attack as follows: 
2.For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: 
b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework 
of international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated[.]58 
This is very similar to the definition provided by Article 51 of 
API, with the addition of “overall.” It may be argued that this 
qualification permits considerations of jus ad bellum (an overall 
justified use of force being granted a wider degree of freedom with 
proportionality), however, this is expressly rejected in the Elements of 
Crimes: 
The expression ‘concrete and direct overall military advantage’ 
refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable by the 
perpetrator at the relevant time. Such advantage may or may 
not be temporally or geographically related to the object of the 
attack. The fact that this crime admits the possibility of lawful 
incidental injury and collateral damage does not in any way 
justify any violation of the law applicable in armed conflict. It 
 
57. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 21. 
58. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 8(2)(b)(vi). 
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does not address justifications for war or other rules related to 
jus ad bellum. It reflects the proportionality requirement 
inherent in determining the legality of any military activity 
undertaken in the context of an armed conflict.59  
This outright prohibition of jus ad bellum considerations was 
reemphasised by the ICRC.60 
As the law currently stands, therefore, the ICC cannot consider 
questions of jus ad bellum in a war crimes trial. That said, one may 
suggest revising the Elements of Crime by removing the explanatory 
note, just as one may dispute the reasoning of the ICRC. I will 
accordingly demonstrate that, even if the explanatory note were 
removed, the ICC would still not be able to consider jus ad bellum 
questions.      
C. Jurisdiction over aggression 
As previously described, although aggression is defined in the 
Rome Statute, the ICC still does not have jurisdiction over the crime. 
This is symptomatic of the high level of discord surrounding the issue 
(as were the 15 years it took to reach agreement on the definition). 
Considering this lack of agreement, it would be nonsensical for the 
ASP to have intended to give jurisdiction over aggression ‘through 
the back door’ (i.e. via the assessment of proportionality).   
D. Principles of individual criminal responsibility  
Permitting aggressor bias at the ICC would put three 
fundamental principles of individual criminal responsibility at risk. 
 
Nullum crimen sine lege 
 
Article 22(1) of the Rome Statute sets out the nullum crimen sine 
lege principle as follows: “A person shall not be criminally responsible 
 
59. INT’L CRIM. CT., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, 19 n.36 (2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/X472-
LBL6]. 
60. Knut Dörmann, Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal 
Court: The Elements of War Crimes Part II: Other serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflicts, 83 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 253, 472 (2001) (“The 
PrepCom’s commentary to the term ‘concrete and direct overall military 
advantage’ stresses that international humanitarian law applies to 
armed conflicts regardless of the cause of the conflict or the motives of 
the parties thereto. It draws attention to the distinct nature of jus ad 
bellum, which is irrelevant in this context, and jus in bello, which is 
alone relevant for assessing whether the proportionality requirement is 
met. These statements are a correct reflection of existing law. The 
clarification is certainly very valuable.”). 
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under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the 
time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”61 
To discriminate against the aggressor would effectively make the 
accused criminally responsible for crimes not yet within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, such aggressor discrimination 
would be a perfect example of extending the definition of war crimes 
by analogy, as prohibited by the second paragraph.62 
 
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali 
 
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali refers to the 
principle of non-retroactivity enshrined in Article 24 of the Rome 
Statute: “No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute 
for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute.”63 
There is a possibility that facts relevant to jus ad bellum of a 
conflict occurred prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute by one or 
more of the belligerents being investigated by the ICC. In such a 
situation, aggressor discrimination would render an accused criminally 
responsible for acts that occurred prior to the activation of the 
jurisdiction of the Court, thereby violating the principle of non-
retroactivity. Such potential violation is not that hard to imagine 
considering that Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and 
Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute years after the outbreak of 
conflicts (which have gone through alternating states of peace and 
war), which are now being investigated by the ICC.64   
 
61. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 22 ¶ 1. 
62. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 22 ¶ 2 (“The definition of a crime 
shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case 
of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person 
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”). 
63. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 24 ¶ 1. 
64. DR Congo ratified the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002 – the ICC is 
investigating the conflict which began in 1998. See States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, ICC, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/democ
ratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx [https://perma.cc/CM7T-
NWPX]; Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court opens its first investigation, ICC (June 6, 
2004), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/P
ages/the%20office%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20of%20the%20internati
onal%20criminal%20court%20opens%20its%20first%20investigation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/X6LB-GNPB]. Uganda ratified the Rome Statute on 
June 14, 2002 – the ICC is investigating the conflict which began in 
1987. See States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/ugand
a.aspx [https://perma.cc/2N5F-Z4FE]; Press Release, Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court opens an investigation into Northern 
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Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat 
 
The presumption of innocence principle is prescribed by Article 66 
of the Rome Statute.65 Proceeding with a presumption of aggressor 
bias would violate the principle, as it holds individuals criminally 
responsible for the act of aggression from the outset of the trial, as 
well as violating the standard of proof required to establish guilt 
“beyond reasonable doubt.”66 
E. Principles of LOAC requiring separation between jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello  
There are a number of principles that apply particularly to LOAC 
as a whole which require distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, and therefore, apply to the ICC. Since attempts have recently 
been made to refute some of these principles, I will also try to refute 
those main counterarguments. Some are also claiming that aggressor 
bias is necessary in response to the increasing practice of ‘lawfare,’ or, 
alternatively, that the ICJ expressly permitted aggressor 
discrimination in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion; I will also 
refute these arguments.  
 
The Humanitarian Nature of LOAC 
 
The very purpose of LOAC is, acknowledging the reality of war, 
to render warfare as humane as possible—hence its alternate 
designation as International Humanitarian Law (IHL). As described 
by the ICRC, it “seek[s], for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects 
of armed conflict… [and] does not regulate whether a State may 
 
Uganda, ICC (July 29, 2004), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/P
ages/prosecutor%20of%20the%20international%20criminal%20court%20
opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern%20uganda.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6VPR-Q4P2]. Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute 
on February 15, 2013 – the ICC is investigating the conflict which began 
in 2002. See States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/african%20states/Pages/Cote_
d_Ivoire.aspx [https://perma.cc/2SUA-FQFW]; Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, No. ICC-02/11, Pre-
Trial (Oct. 3, 2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1240553.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RQ9-72FB]. 
65. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 66 ¶ 1 (“Everyone shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance 
with the applicable law.”). 
66. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 66 ¶ 3 (“In order to convict the 
accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt.”). 
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actually use force.”67 The two branches of law, jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello, serve considerably different, albeit related, purposes. To 
suggest that one influences the other risks undermining one, the other 
or both. If jus ad bellum becomes a factor in determining war crimes, 
it risks being perceived as just that—a factor of war crimes—rather 
than an outright prohibition of the unilateral use of force. As for jus 
in bello, it then becomes biased and loses the impartial respect for 
human personality and dignity on which it is founded.68  
 
Identifying the Aggressor 
 
Since the prohibition of unilateral force, aggression has been 
defined: once by the UN General Assembly in 1974 and once by the 
ASP in 2010.69 It is further contended that, regardless of these 
definitions (or at least without even mentioning them), the 
international community has generally been concordant in denouncing 
illegal use of force.70 It could well be argued, therefore, that there are 
no issues in defining an aggressor as an element of war crimes. 
However, despite general agreement by the international community, 
there still remain too many instances of contention to allow it to 
become a commonplace consideration in a war crimes trial, without 
any political connotations.  
In criticising arguments against permitting “aggressor bias,” 
Orakhelashvili mentions U.S. activities following the September 11th 
terrorist attacks as examples where attempts to interpret jus ad 
bellum creatively (e.g. pre-emptive self-defence or implicitly authorised 
humanitarian intervention) have failed due to the restrictive definition 
now in effect.71 Theoretically, this is just fine; the dubious legality of 
U.S. use of force has been widely reported and debated. However, 
 
67. Int’l Comm. Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law?, 
(July 2004), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N9MT-8BEH]. 
68. INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 
19, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RS5Q-R83F] (“Each of [the GCs] is inspired by 
respect for human personality and dignity; together they establish the 
principle of disinterested aid to all victims of war without discrimination 
– to all those who, whether through wounds capture or shipwreck, are 
no longer enemies but merely suffering and defenceless [sic] human 
beings.”).  
69. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Mar. 11–Apr. 12, 1974); I.C.C. Res. 6 (June 11, 
2010). 
70. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 2, at 173-78 (discussing the appropriate 
use of force). 
71. Orakhelashvili, supra note 2, at 178. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Can ICC Consider Questions on Jus Ad Bellum in a War Crimes Trial? 
292 
thirteen years after the invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. forces remain 
active all over the Middle East. The fact that the U.S. continues to 
wage an illegal “War on Terror,” with intermittent support from a 
variety of states, suggests that, either we have not yet reached a 
reliable definition of aggression, or that it is still an ultimately 
political consideration (and therefore should be left out of criminal 
courts). 
Since Orakhelashvili’s article, we have witnessed Russia’s illegal 
invasion and annexation of the Crimea, which Russia (as expected) 
contends was permissible.72 The widespread condemnation of both 
Russia and the U.S.’s activities demonstrates that, in these instances, 
the issue is one of politics, not legal definition. Nevertheless, such 
politicisation is reason enough to exclude jus ad bellum considerations 
from a war crimes trial.  
Alongside this politicisation of jus ad bellum, there has been, and 
continues to be, much discord in defining aggression in relation to 
individual criminal responsibility. As previously mentioned, although 
aggression is listed as a crime in the Rome Statute, the ICC will still 
not have jurisdiction over aggression until, at the earliest, 2017, 
depending on a decision by the ASP.  
These issues of politicisation and indecision lead to the conclusion 
that aggression is to be considered by the UN, or to be considered as 
an independent crime with its own elements to be properly examined 
(once the ICC has jurisdiction); but at very least to be left out of jus 
in bello considerations.  
 
Encouraging Further Violations of the Laws of War 
 
It has been suggested that knowledge of an aggressor 
discrimination would incite no change in the conduct of warfare (the 
motivation then being purely punitive), citing to the example of 
major military powers (e.g. Germany in WWII) having flagrantly 
violated LOAC despite being well aware of it.73  This is irrelevant as, 
although countless war crimes did occur, there are a number of 
circumstances in which the German army did abide by LOAC, 
notably in relation to allied POWs, though observance varied.74 
 
72. See Crimea Crisis: Russian President Putin’s Speech Annotated, BBC 
(Mar. 19. 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26652058 
[http://perma.cc/RD3A-6JNL].   
73. Orakhelashvili, supra note 2, at 178-79.  
74. See ICRC in WWII: Polish Prisoners of War in Germany: Why the 
ICRC Was Unable to Keep Track of Polish POWs Captured by German 
Forces, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Feb. 2, 2005), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnwv.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J7UF-RPBN] (discussing the treatment of “Polish 
soldiers who became prisoners of war” during WWII). 
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Furthermore, the German army did interact with the ICRC 
throughout the war, at times allowing relief to be sent to POWs.75 
This is not a defence of Germany, but a demonstration of the tangible 
effect of LOAC, even in a conflict as horrendous as WWII. As 
affirmed by Jean Pictet, former Vice-President of the ICRC, “if one 
single individual is saved by the application of the LOAC, the whole 
exercise would have been worth the expense.”76 In addition to a policy 
commitment to LOAC, in a conflict such as WWII, there will 
necessarily be a cross-section of an aggressor’s armed force that does 
not share the same radical ideologies as their leaders and who will, 
either throughout the conflict or at least in the face of defeat, make 
efforts to abide by LOAC.   
At the policy level, aggression is necessarily backed by very strong 
conviction and determination to achieve one’s aim in the knowledge 
that one will be heavily scrutinised internationally. Speeches by 
terrorist leaders, leaders of radical rebel groups or the heads of state 
of “isolationist”77 countries, as reported in the news, reveal a policy of 
denouncing “the West,” often with claims of indirect colonialisation. 
To permit aggressor bias only adds weight to these assertions and 
risks delegitimising the court.  
Alternatively, knowledge of aggressor bias may encourage the 
victim-state to violate LOAC. Knowing that they have a wider 
margin of discretion may lead combatants and leaders to be less 
careful in their assessments of proportionality in attack. 
          
The ‘Innocent Soldier’ 
 
An analysis of Nuremberg jurisprudence has determined the 
following three principles in relation to aggression: 
1. [N]on-governmental actors can commit the crime of 
aggression;  
2. [A]ggression is a policy-level crime; and  
 
75. See The ICRC in WWII: Overview of Activities, INT’L COMM. RED 
CROSS (Feb. 2, 2005), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/history-world-war-
2-overview-020205.htm [https://perma.cc/VT3W-CY84] (discussing how 
“ICRC delegates visited prisoners of war”). 
76. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 283. 
77. “Isolationism” means “[a] policy of remaining apart from the affairs or 
interests of other groups, especially the political affairs of other 
countries.” Isolationism, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/isolationism 
[http://perma.cc/4A4M-4DW5]. 
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3. [A]n individual is at the policy level if he is in a position to 
“shape or influence” a state’s political or military action.78    
Moreover, the definition of aggression now provided by the Rome 
Statute requires “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by 
a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct 
the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression . . . 
.”79 What these definitions reflect is the nature of aggression as a 
“leadership crime;” they both require the accused to have, at least, 
influence in the military or political planning of the act of aggression. 
Øverland provides a suitable description of the concept of the 
innocence of individual soldiers, explaining that “[i]n addition to being 
young, uneducated, and swayed by their superiors and public 
authorities, soldiers fight out of loyalty to their country and out of 
lawful subservience to it.”80  
To consider aggression in a war crimes trial, therefore, risks 
punishing combatants who had no, or at least insignificant, roles in 
the decision to commit the act of aggression and who, under formal 
jus ad bellum regimes, would not be held responsible. The UN already 
provides mechanisms to respond to aggression at the State level, 
whilst the ASP is in the tedious process of determining the specific 
elements required to attribute individual criminal responsibility for 
the crime of aggression. To that end, not only would it be unjust, but 
also unnecessary to consider aggression in a war crimes trial.   
 
F. Arguments in favour of aggressor bias   
‘Lawfare’ and Asymmetric Warfare 
 
Lawfare, described as “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as 
a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational 
 
78. Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership 
Requirement in the Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 477, 488 
(2007). 
79. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, 
Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, art. 8 bis (June 11, 2010), available at 
https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/AMENDMENTS/CN.651.2010-ENG-
CoA.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LGV-CANL]. 
80. Gerhard Øverland, Killing Soldiers, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 455, 460 
(2006). 
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objective,”81 is becoming an increasingly prevalent practice, in 
particular in relation to asymmetric warfare.82  
We are seeing increasing use of “hostage-taking, co-location of … 
military objects with civilian objects, use of human shields, use of 
suicide bombers disguised as civilians, indiscriminate attacks, use of 
proxy forces to engage in unlawful operations while denying all 
responsibility for their actions and deliberate attacks on civilians.”83 
In such a situation, where usually the unlawful belligerent resorts 
to lawfare, it may be tempting to grant the other belligerent more 
leeway in their assessment of proportionality to respond to the 
ensuing difficulties. This is an unconvincing argument, as it simply 
leads to further victimisation of innocent civilians—an antithetical 
situation where the very law protecting civilians in fact puts them at 
risk. Such a possibility has been considered and prohibited by API. 
The final section of Article 51 (which defines proportionality) provides 
that,”[a]ny violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties 
to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian 
population and civilians, including the obligation to take the 
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57.”84 
As well as being reprehensible, aggressor discrimination in this 
scenario is unnecessary. There already exists an (albeit controversial) 
response to violation of LOAC by an opponent: belligerent reprisal – 
“violations of the LOAC committed in response to violations of the 
LOAC by the other party, in order to induce that other party to 
comply with the law.”85 It may be said that the highly dubious 
legality of such reprisals renders them an unsuitable response to 
asymmetric warfare; however, the concept of belligerent reprisals is 
nowadays so restricted as to be agreeably humanitarian. Compared to 
the ambiguous concept of a variable proportionality in attack, 
belligerent reprisals are strictly defined and heavily limited by 
LOAC.86 They are also prohibited outright against protected persons 
and objects. 87  
81. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L 
AFF. 146, 146 (2008).  
82. “[Asymmetric warfare is population-centric nontraditional warfare] [sic] 
waged between a militarily superior power and one or more inferior 
powers,” see David L. Buffaloe, Defining Asymmetric Warfare, 58 LAND 
WARFARE PAPERS 1, 17 (2006), 
http://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW%20Web-
ExclusivePubs/Land%20Warfare%20Papers/LWP_58.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/E433-3BZX]. 
83. Roberts, supra note 37, at 949. 
84. Protocol I, supra note 39, at art. 51(8). 
85. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 173. 
86. Kolb and Hyde have identified the following restrictions applying to 
belligerent reprisals: 
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Nevertheless, I also disagree with the practice of belligerent 
reprisals, if only for their prohibition in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.88 Article 60 prohibits terminating or suspending 
treaties of humanitarian character in response to material breach by 
the other party.89 This provision likewise prohibits aggressor 
discrimination.    
 
 a) The purpose of reprisals may only be to secure future law-compliance, 
not, for example, to punish for a violation of the war; 
 b) Reprisals must be a measure of last resort (ultima ratio); no other, 
less intrusive, means for securing law-compliance must be available; 
 c) Reprisals must be proportionate to the wrong suffered; 
 d) The decision to take reprisals must be made at the highest level of 
government; and 
 e) Reprisals must cease as soon as the adversary complied with the law.  
 KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 176.  
87. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 174. 
88. The VCLT is considered by many to reflect customary law.  See Karl 
Zemanek, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. 
AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L., http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/vclt/vclt-
e.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZ87-REC9] (discussing the influence of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
89. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_196
9.pdf [http://perma.cc/AMB6-VHYJ]. According to art. 60: 
 1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles 
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or 
suspending its operation in whole or in part.  
 2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties 
entitles:  
 (a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation 
of the treaty in whole or in  
 part or to terminate it either:  
 (i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or  
 (ii) as between all the parties;  
 (b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for 
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the 
relations between itself and the defaulting State;  
 (c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a 
ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part 
with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material 
breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of 
every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations 
under the treaty.  
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The ‘War on Terror’ is an interesting example of asymmetric 
conflict which has provoked claims by the U.S. that LOAC either 
doesn’t or shouldn’t apply equally between belligerents. To begin 
with, it is highly questionable that the U.S. did have jus ad bellum in 
invading Afghanistan. Not only did the 9/11 attacks not qualify as 
aggression under jus ad bellum,90 there also exists no right to “pre-
emptive self-defence” in international law.91 That said, even if the 
War on Terror is a legitimate armed conflict, arguments in favour of 
aggressor discrimination have nevertheless been negated—LOAC is 
still able to respond to such a conflict; POWs may be tried for war 
crimes and violations of the criminal law applicable to combatants, 
and at any rate, most terrorists are not captured during combat but 
during law enforcement operations (the legality of which is also highly 
dubious).92          
Rather than provide justifications for aggressor discrimination, 
the War on Terror has shown the inherent dangers of conflating jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello – hundreds of thousands of civilians have 
died in military operations targeting a very small number of terrorists 
in self-defence of an anticipated, albeit unidentified, attack. 
Furthermore, the U.S.’s attempts to circumvent LOAC93 have 
 
 3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists 
in:  
 (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present 
Convention; or  
 (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the 
object or purpose of the treaty.  
 4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in 
the treaty applicable in the event of a breach.  
 5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the 
protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian 
character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals 
against persons protected by such treaties.  
90. See Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to 
Self-Defence, Article 51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International 
Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35, 43 (2003) (explaining the 
qualifications under the Definition of Aggression). 
91. Cryer et al., supra note 4, at 318 (referenced in the discussion on 
“aggression”). 
92. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 1, at 27. 
93. For example, by claiming that captured terror suspects are “unlawful 
combatants” and therefore not entitled to POW status, or by 
establishing a detention camp outside US jurisdiction in order to torture 
said suspects.  See generally, Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of 
“Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants”, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 
(2003), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_849_dorman.pdf 
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returned very little in thirteen years, with increasing claims that the 
War on Terror has in fact encouraged further radicalisation and 
terrorism.94 It seems likely that aggressor discrimination would have a 
similar effect. As the ICRC puts it, “it is generally not the rules that 
are at fault, but the will or sometimes the ability of the parties to an 
armed conflict—and of the international community—to enforce 
them”95. 
Nuclear Weapons and ‘Extreme Self-Defence’ 
 
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ determined 
that, “the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State 
would be at stake.”96 
It may be argued that this conclusion has created a definitive link 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, allowing aggressor 
discrimination in “extreme” circumstances of State survival. It may 
further be argued that, without defining “an extreme circumstance of 
self-defence in which the very survival of a State would be at stake,” 
States are free to interpret the standard themselves (one can imagine 
the U.S. qualifying the 9/11 attacks as such). However, this would be 
an incorrect interpretation of the Advisory Opinion. The Court made 
clear that such use would still have to comply with the principles of 
proportionality and necessity.97 This is not replacing jus in bello with 
jus ad bellum, this is simply applying LOAC to nuclear weapons.         
 
[https://perma.cc/L75S-LPRT]; Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of 
Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 345 (2002). 
94. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti, Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens 
Terrorism Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror.html?
_r=0 [http://perma.cc/TH8S-DVA6]. 
95. Int’l Comm. Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the 
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Document Prepared by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross for the 30th International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, Switzerland, 
26-30 November 2007, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 719, 734 (2007), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-867-ihl-challenges.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BTY2-9CGV]. 
96. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 2E (July 8), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/7497.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZWL7-DHTC]. 
97. Moussa, supra note 7, at 969-72. 
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G. Case Law  
Under Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, the ICC can apply 
“general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world . . . “98 As part of its Customary IHL 
Study, the ICRC reviewed national practice in relation to 
proportionality in attack. A quick look through their findings reveals 
the same neutral definition of proportionality throughout national 
legislation and jurisprudence as found in international law; there are 
no references to aggressor bias.99 
International judicial decisions may also be useful as “they often 
elaborate, with varying focus or precision, on the content and 
development of the legal standards relevant”100 to LOAC. As will be 
seen, a variety of tribunals have reaffirmed the separation between jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello. Furthermore, according to Article 21(2) of 
the Rome Statute, the ICC can “apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions.”101 
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
 
In Fofana & Kondewa, when rejecting a reduction of sentence 
handed down by the Trial Chamber based on the “just and 
defendable”102 cause of the defendants, the Appeals Chamber 
reaffirmed the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, 
describing it as a “bedrock principle”103 of LOAC. It went on to state 
that conflation of the principles “provides implicit legitimacy to 
conduct that unequivocally violates the law—the precise conduct this 
Special Court was established to punish.”104 
In Taylor, the Defence tried to argue that the Trial Chamber had 
not taken into account the neutral nature of the war crimes in 
question, as well as the legitimacy of the use of force commissioned by 
 
98. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 21(1)(c). 
99. See Customary IHL: Practice Relating to Rule 14. Proportionality in 
Attack, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter4_rule14_SectionA 
[https://perma.cc/8GRJ-EYRB]. 
100. Orakhelashvili, supra note 2, at 167. 
101. Rome Statute, supra note 4, at art. 21(2). 
102. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment 
on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶ 86 (Trial 
Chamber I Oct. 9, 2007). 
103. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 
531 (Appeals Chamber May 28, 2008).  
104. Id. at ¶ 534.  
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Taylor.105 The Appeals Chamber upheld the Prosecution’s claim that 
the Defence “conflate[d] jus ad bellum and jus in bello, since an 
accused can be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in 
otherwise lawful activity,”106 asserting that “[t]he distinction between 
criminal and non-criminal acts of assistance is not drawn on the basis 
of the act in the abstract, but on its effect in fact.”107 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
 
In Kordic and Cerkez, the Trial Chamber, in applying the ground 
for excluding criminal responsibility of self-defence provided for by 
Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, emphasised that “military 
operations in self-defence do not provide a justification for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”108 Although this was in 
reference to grounds for excluding criminal liability, it is applicable to 
proportionality. More explicitly, the Appeals Chamber noted that, 
“[t]he unfortunate legacy of wars shows that until today many 
perpetrators believe that violations of binding international norms can 
be lawfully committed, because they are fighting for a “just cause.” 
Those people have to understand that international law is applicable 
to everybody, in particular during times of war.”109 
In its Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
addressed allegations that, since NATO’s recourse to armed force was 
unlawful, all subsequent measures taken by NATO were also illegal.110 
Having defined both jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the traditional 
sense, the OTP concluded that: 
As a matter of practice, which [the OTP] consider to be in 
accord with the most widely accepted and reputable legal 
opinion, … the OTP have deliberately refrained from assessing 
 
105. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, ¶ 393 
(Appeals Chamber Sept. 26, 2013). 
106. Id. at ¶ 394.  
107. Id. at ¶ 395. 
108. Prosecutor v. Kordić & C̆erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 
452 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber Feb. 
26, 2001). 
109. Prosecutor v. Kordić & C̆erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 
1082 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber 
Dec. 17, 2004). 
110. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review 
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, ¶¶ 30-34, U.N. Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E (June 13, 2000). 
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jus ad bellum issues in [their] work and focused exclusively on 
whether or not individuals have committed serious violations of 
international humanitarian law as assessed within the confines 
of the jus in bello.111 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) 
 
The TRC is not a court; however, as a reputable alternative to 
criminal prosecution, its proclamations do provide support to general 
principles of law. On the point of proportionality, it “rejected the 
African National Congress’ claim ‘that it should be judged differently 
than the apartheid government because it was engaged in a just war 
against apartheid.’”112   
 
The International Criminal Court 
 
In Lubanga Dyilo, the Chamber dismissed a personal statement 
from Mr. Lubanga claiming that he had accepted his “position of 
responsibility not for power but for peace, and he submitted that the 
UPC was created, and the FPLC soldiers were trained, in order to 
pursue this objective.”113 Accepting his motivations, the Chamber 
stated that it was “only of limited relevance given the persistent 
recruitment of child soldiers during the period covered by the charges. 
The critical factor is that, in order to achieve his goals, he used 
children as part of the armed forces over which he had control.”114  
In Germain Katanga, Judge Van den Wyngaert (dissenting) 
resolved that: 
[T]he Court’s success or failure cannot be measured just in 
terms of ‘bad guys’ being convicted and innocent victims 
receiving reparation. Success or failure is determined first and 
foremost by whether or not the proceedings, as a whole, have 
been fair and just.115 
This is a very fitting conclusion to this section, which 
demonstrates that the practice of the ICC and other international 
criminal courts is to reject jus ad bellum considerations.  
 
111. Id. at ¶ 34.  
112. Blank, supra note 50, at 720. 
113. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision 
on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 86 (Trial Chamber 
I July 10, 2012). 
114. Id. at ¶ 87. 
115. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-AnxI, Minority 
Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 310 (Trial Chamber 
II Mar. 7, 2014). 
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IV. Conclusion  
Can the ICC consider questions on jus ad bellum in a war crimes 
trial? The answer is no. Aside from being explicitly prohibited by the 
explanatory note in the Elements of Crimes (a primary source of law), 
such consideration would violate: 
provisions of LOAC; 
principles of LOAC; 
the very humanitarian nature of LOAC; 
principles of individual criminal responsibility; and 
general principles of law, as reflected in national and 
international case-law. 
Arguments in favour of allowing such jus ad bellum considerations 
in response to lawfare are weak; the two branches of law, jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello, are suited to address illegal use of force and 
war crimes respectively. Failures within the two branches are by 
reason of political will and lack of enforcement and it is these issues 
which should be addressed. As to the lex ferenda, it seems very 
unlikely that the ICC will be able to consider jus ad bellum prior to 
its jurisdiction being activated by the ASP, and rightly so; once the 
ASP votes in favour of activating jurisdiction, the ICC will be able to 
prosecute those actually responsible for the act of aggression, 
determined according to the principles of criminal law in the course of 
a proper and thorough examination.      
 
